We study the role of reciprocity in a labor market field experiment. In a recent paper, Gneezy and List (2006) investigate the impact of gift exchange in this context and find that it has only a transient effect on long run outcomes. Extending their work to examine both positive and negative reciprocity, we find consonant evidence in the positive reciprocity condition: the gift does not work well in the long run (if at all). Yet, in the negative reciprocity treatment we observe much stronger effects: a wage reduction has a significant and lasting negative impact on efforts. Together, these results highlight the asymmetry of positive and negative reciprocity that exists in the field, and provide an indication of the relative importance of each in the long run.
Introduction
Reciprocal motivations are probably the most prominent explanation for the hypothesis of eciency wages and the associated phenomenon of involuntary unemployment in equilibrium (see Akerlof (1982) , Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990) ). An impressive amount of lab experimental evidence underpins the role of reciprocity 1 in labor market relationships. In Fehr et al. (1993) 's classic gift exchange experiment, a principal can pay a wage to an agent, who in turn exerts costly eort that generates a payo for the principal. They observe a positive wage-eort relationship: paying above-minimum wages (i.e. sharing part of the prots) is perceived as kind and rewarded by a high eort of the worker. Hence, reciprocity seems to be able to mitigate enforcement problems of incomplete contracts (see Fehr et al. (1997) procity, specically with respect to one crucial aspect that has previously not been considered in lab experiments: the duration of the task. In their natural eld experiment the recruited students had to perform a data entry or a door-to-door fund raising task. During the rst few hours GL observe a signicant dierence in performance between their Gift treatment, where the subjects received an unexpected increase in hourly wages, and the control treatment. These treatment eects did, however, not persist and quickly vanished. GL attribute this decrease to an adaptation after the immediatè hot' phase of decision making.
1 By reciprocity we refer to the psychological phenomenon of people's (un)kind reactions towards (un)kind actions in the absence of reputational concerns. For formal models of reciprocity, cf. Rabin (1993) , Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) , Falk and Fischbacher (2006) or Cox et al. (2005) .
2 Note that this is not about external validity of laboratory results in general. The question is rather whether the usually implemented gift exchange design captures all relevant features of a natural occurring work environment, see Harrison and List (2004) , List (2006) , Levitt and List (2006) .
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The present study is motivated by a number of recent experimental studies and surveys suggesting that reciprocal reactions are of asymmetric nature. Specically, it is frequently observed that negative reciprocity is a much stronger and more robust phenomenon than positive reciprocity. 3 We therefore hypothesize that in contrast to a wage increase, cutting wages can have a persistent detrimental impact on work morale and eorts. In order to test this hypothesis we conducted an experiment in a natural occurring work environment. The small library of an economic chair at a German University had to be catalogued, and we thus had the opportunity to implement a design which closely followed GL's library task. We hired students to catalogue the books of the library for a limited time duration of six hours at an announced hourly wage of presumably 15 Euros -the amount actually paid out in our benchmark treatment. In our main treatment, we triggered negative reciprocity by telling them, right before they started to work, that we would pay them only 10 Euro per hour. While this treatment complements the work of GL 4 , we additionally ran a positive reciprocity treatment (by paying subjects 20 instead of 15 Euros per hour) for the purpose of replicating GL's results. Since we were especially interested in the duration of the eects, after six hours of work each subject was oered to work an additional hour for 15 Euro (irrespective of the initial treatment).
Our results suggest that wage-cuts can have severe implications on workers' eort. Moreover, during the observed period there is no signicant indication that workers adapted to the lower wage over time and increased their eort relative to the benchmark treatment. On the contrary, the detrimental eect is so strong that it cannot be compensated for by setting the wages back to their original level. Our results suggest that negative reciprocity plays an important role in actual labor markets. In line with GL, the evidence for the role of positive reciprocity is less conclusive. In fact, we found even less evidence for gift exchange in the short run.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we describe the experimental design. Subsequently, in Sections 3 and 4, the experimental results are described and discussed.
Experimental Design
In August 2006 the library of an economic chair at a German University had to be catalogued. We took this opportunity to run a eld experiment, building upon GL's experimental design. We recruited undergraduate students from all over the campus via posters. The announcement read that it was a one-time job opportunity for one day (six hours) that will be paid presumably 15 Euro per hour. 6 About 200 students applied during the two-months' announcement phase. A research assistant randomly picked 30 persons out of the list of applicants. They were invited via email and asked to conrm the starting date, reminding them that the job would pay presumably 15 Euro per hour. Upon arriving at working day, the subjects were seated in front of a computer terminal with a table of randomly picked books beside them.
Their task was to enter into an electronic data base the books' author(s), title, publisher, year and ISBN number. Participants were allowed to take a break whenever necessary. A research assistant explained the task to them, strictly following a xed protocol. Then, subjects were told their hourly wage and started working.
We conducted three dierent treatments. The hourly wages paid were 15 Euro in our benchmark treatment (treatment Neutral ), 20 Euro in the positive reciprocity treatment (treatment Kind ) and 10 Euro in the negative reciprocity treatment (treatment Unkind ). 7 No reason was given to the sub-5 In a eld experiment with a dierent task, Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2005) also do not nd evidence for any form of positive reciprocity. 6 The announcement said presumably, or prospective (the exact German wording was voraussichtlich), in order to raise appropriate expectations without cheating.
7 10 Euro still exceed the hourly wages usually paid to a student helper at the University 5 jects about why they were paid more or less than the announced 15 Euro.
We had 10 subjects in the benchmark and negative reciprocity treatment, and 9 subjects in the positive reciprocity treatment, since one subject did not show up to work.
The experiment took place over a 10 days' period, with 3 subjects per day (one in each treatment). The subjects showed up successively at dierent times and were separated from each other, in dierent rooms at an online computer terminal, without being monitored. 8 The computer application in which they entered the details of the books, recorded the exact time of each log, allowing us to exactly reconstruct the amount of books each person entered over time and the time span between two books entered. After 6 hours elapsed, everyone had to complete a questionnaire asking (among other things) how they perceived the task and the wage. In order to observe them in a`natural work environment', subjects were not told that they were taking part in an experiment.
After completing the questionnaire, all subjects were asked if they were willing to work immediately an additional hour for 15 Euros (irrespective of their initial treatment). In case they rejected this oer, they were paid their total wage and left. Otherwise, they worked one additional hour and received their total wage payment afterwards. The data gained from the additional hour enables us to compare the performance of a subject under dierent wages. Unfortunately, only three subjects in Neutral and two subjects in Kind, but seven subjects in Unkind agreed to work an additional hour.
of Karlsruhe, which is 7.53 Euro. We paid higher wages in the benchmark treatment, since we wanted to focus on the eect of the unexpected change rather than the absolute height of the wage, which would otherwise have been extremely low in the Unkind treatment. 8 All this was done in order to minimize the possible bias of other inuences, like peer eects, monitoring eects, time of start or day of work. Furthermore, all subjects interacted with the same research assistant to eliminate experimenter eects. In order not to induce an experimenter demand eect, the research assistant did know neither the purpose of the study nor the reason for the wage cut/rise. 6 Figure 1 illustrates the average eort (measured by the number of books logged) per 90 respectively 15 minutes time intervals for the three dierent treatments. Table 1 contains the average treatment eects, i.e. the dierence in average number of books logged, and the p-values (two sided) from the corresponding nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the null hypothesis of equal eort between treatments. Over the entire period we observe a substantial dierence in eort between subjects in the Neutral and Unkind treatments. This eect is highly signicant from a statistical and economic point of view (see columns three and four in Table 1 ). On average, workers in the Unkind treatment logged 56 (or 27 percent) books less than in the benchmark treatment.
9 Moreover, as hypothesized, and in contrast to the ndings of GL for positive reciprocity, there is no indication for any adaptation over the observed periods (i.e. the average treatment eect remains large and signicant over time) 10 .
Concerning positive reciprocity, the average treatment eect for the wage increase is marginally small during the rst 90 minutes' period. Only between minutes 181 and 270 we nd an eect which is signicant at a 10 percent level (see column two of Table 1 ). In line with the results of GL, there is only weak support for the existence of positive reciprocity; in fact, we do not even nd much evidence for gift exchange in the short run. Workers provided on average 10 percent more eort (or logged 21 more books) due to the wage increase. This dierence is statistically not signicant and less than half of the absolute magnitude of the discrepancy between the treatments Unkind and Neutral. 9 For the chosen calibration the average costs per book logged do not dier signicantly between the treatments Unkind (0.43 Euro) and Neutral (0.44 Euro). Our attention is focused on the impact of wages on eort, since any statements about eciency would arbitrarily depend on the chosen parameters.
10 Alternatively, one could dene adaptation as the dierence between the number of books entered in the rst and the last 90 minutes. In this sense, the neutral treatment has a roughly 14% increase whereas the unkind treatment has a roughly 30% increase, suggesting that there might be convergence as in GL. We are grateful to John List for pointing this out. However, the null hypothesis of equal dierences between the treatments Unkind and Neutral cannot be rejected using a two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p=0.45).
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The regression results in Table 2 are very much in line with the preceding nonparametric analysis. In column (1) we use the same linear Random Eects model specication as GL and add an indicator for the Unkind treatment and the corresponding interaction terms with the Timet dummies. The coecient for Unkind is highly signicant whereas the one for Kind does not reach any conventional signicance level. Moreover, all of the U nkind * T imet interaction eects are insignicant, suggesting that there was no adaptation over the observed period. On the other hand, as indicated by the estimated Kind * T imet coecients, the eect of Kind is signicantly higher after the rst 90 minutes elapsed.
11 A further interesting result -which is also clearly visible in Figure 1 -is that the number of books logged increased substantially over time, which we interpret as a learning eect. As reported in column (2) all results discussed so far are robust if higher frequency data -consisting of 15 minutes time intervals -is 12 used.
13, 14
In addition to the eect on the quantity of eort, we also investigated the impact of our treatments on the quality of eort. Following the method of Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2005) we measured the quality of output by the ratio of faultless logs to the total number of books entered. 15 We found that our treatments had no signicant impact on the quality of the eort provided (see last column in Table 3 ). 16 The regression results in column (3) of Table 2 11 Nevertheless, the null hypothesis that all Kind * T imet interaction eects are equal to zero cannot be rejected (Wald test χ 2 = 5.70 P rob > χ 2 = 0.1271). 12 Is or are depending on the background knowledge of Latin. 13 Note that we have chosen an alternative specication for the higher frequency data in order to avoid the large number of coecients that would have resulted if we used dummy variables. Instead of the T imet dummies we constructed the variable T ime which takes values from 1 to 24 indicating the time period.
14 As an alternative to the random eects Generalized Least Squares regression we also ran all regressions using OLS with clustered standard errors. The coecient estimates for Kind * T ime3 (p=0.126), Kind * T ime4 (p=0.141) and -using 15 minutes intervalsKind * T ime (p=0.156) become insignicant. All other results remain unchanged in terms of signicance and magnitude. 15 Our measure of quality accounts for spelling mistakes in the titles of the books. Two research assistants searched for errors in the titles by running an automatic spell checking program. 16 
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Summarizing, we nd that wage-cuts have severe implications on workers' eort. Moreover, during the observed period there is no signicant indication that workers adapted to the lower wage over time. On the contrary, the detrimental eect is so strong that it cannot be compensated for by setting the wages back to their original level. While these results are broadly supportive for the notion of negative reciprocity in labor markets, the evidence for positive reciprocity is less conclusive. In line with GL we do not nd a signicant positive relationship between higher wages and eort, not even in the short run. 18 The response of eort to the higher wage is lagged and 17 Only few subjects were willing to work for an additional hour in the treatments Kind (N=3) and Neutral (N=2). Therefore, in the following we only consider the 7 subjects that agreed to work for an additional hour in the Unkind treatment.
18 If one denes eort in GL's fundraising task as number of households approached rather than amount of dollar raised, which seems in some sense more appropriate, there is also no indication of positive reciprocity at all, not even in the short run (cf. Footnote 9 in GL). 9 about half the magnitude of the response to a wage reduction of the same size. 19 The quality of workers' output does not signicantly dier between all of our treatments.
At least three potential reasons might have caused the observed dierences between GL's and our results concerning the eect in the short run.
First, the wage increase implemented by GL (66 percent) was -in relative terms -twice as large as ours (33 percent) and consequently might have been evaluated more positively. Second, as mentioned above the hourly wage offered in Neutral (15 Euros) was well above the usually paid 7.53 Euros for student helpers. Thus, subjects could have already perceived 15 Euros as a generous oer and provided an above average eort. In fact, the number of books logged during the rst 90 minutes in our Neutral treatment (49.7 books) is nearly identical to the eort provided in GL's Gif t treatment (51.7 books). Finally, and related to this, the results for the Kind treatment might have been aected by a ceiling eect. If an average of 50 books per 90 minutes corresponds to the physical limit for unexperienced subjects, even an increased eort in Kind could have not resulted in a higher measurable output than in N eutral. Only due to the learning eect the workers in Kind were able to gradually increase their output. Note that all potential explanations are related to the actual parametrization of the experiment. This highlights that future research, both in the eld and in the lab, should take issues related to parametrization very seriously.
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Our most striking nding is the asymmetry between positive and negative reciprocity in our data. The result from this experiment, that negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity, is in line with previous evidence from surveys and lab experiments. Campbell and Kamlani (1997) , for instance, explore the reasons for wage rigidity and survey wage setting 19 In related work, Al-Ubaydli et al. (2006) also nd that the positive relationship between higher wages and eort (in a dierent task) occurs with a time lag. On the other hand, Maréchal and Thöni (2006) nd evidence for immediate positive reciprocal reactions in a natural eld experiment with sales representatives. 20 In the taxonomy proposed by Engelmann and Ortmann (2001) the sensitivity of the results towards parametrization is called rst-degree robustness. See also Fehr et al. (2002) , Rigdon (2002) or Pereira et al. (2006) for rst-degree robustness checks of gift exchange in the lab. 10 individuals from 184 rms. They nd that the respondents expected that the eect of wages on eort would be strongly asymmetric (p. 778) in the sense that eort is more sensitive to wage-cuts than to wage increases. This point was also put forth by Bewley (1999) and Blinder and Choi (1990) . In a lab experiment, Oerman (2002) comes to the same conclusion showing that negative reciprocity as a reaction to intentionally hurtful behavior is substantively more frequent than positive reciprocal reactions to helpful behavior. 21 Oerman suggests that a self serving bias might be a potential reason for the Our results provide some suggestive evidence for negative reciprocal motivations as a determinant of downward wage rigidity. It seems worthwhile to asses the robustness of this eect of negative reciprocity in future research.
Three aspects appear to be especially important. First, our time horizon is limited to one day of work. Extending the time horizon and testing for the robustness of our results is consequently an important next step. Secondly, we avoided to communicate any reasons for the changes in hourly wages.
However, the evidence from rm surveys is broadly conclusive that wagecuts are expected to have a higher acceptance among the workers if they are necessary to prevent bankruptcy and large scale dismissals. 23 Hence, the framing of wage-cuts will probably play an important role. And nally, if workers suer from nominal illusion, real wage-cuts -by increasing nominal wages at a lower rate than ination -are more likely to be possible without incurring the risk of a detrimental eect on work morale.
24 21 For further consonant evidence in laboratory experiments, see Brandts and Charness (1999) , Engelmann and Ortmann (2001) or Thöni and Gächter (2006) . 22 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . 23 See Kaufman (1984) , Kahneman et al. (1986) , Blinder and Choi (1990 ) Campbell and Kamlani (1997 ) or Bewley (1999 .
24 See Kahneman et al. (1986) , Blinder and Choi (1990) or Agell and Bennmarker (2004) . 
